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ARTICLES 
CAPTIVE COURTS: THE DESTRUCTION 
OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS BY 
AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES 
JILL E. FISCH* 
INTRODUCTION 
Some Articles in this colloquium issue examine the role of se­
crecy in environmental litigation. There are many ways that parties 
to any lawsuit can keep the information and results of the litigation 
confidential. These include conducting discovery under the protec­
tion of confidentiality agreements, settling cases prior to trial and 
having the court file and pleadings placed under seal, and engaging 
in methods of alternative dispute resolution that do not leave a pub­
lic record. 1 All these procedures have been criticized as interfering 
with the public's right to know about the case and its outcome.2 
Defenders of secrecy respond that the conduct of the litigation is 
properly left to the parties and that, so long as they agree to secrecy, 
there has been no harm to the judicial process. 3 They further claim 
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. B.A.,  1 982 , Cor­
nell University; J .D ., I985, Yale Law School. 
1 See, e.g., The Terms of Secrecy, WASH. PosT, Oct. 23, 1 988, at A22 {describ­
ing methods of resolving litigation in secret). 
2 See, e.g., Philip Carrizosa, Making the Law Disappear, CAL . LAW. ,  Sept. 
I989, at 65 (describing depublication of judicial opinions in California); Elizabeth 
Kolbert, Chief Judge of New York Urges Less Secrecy in Civil Settlements, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 20, 1 990, at  AI (quoting New York Chief Judge Sol  Wachtler and 
others criticizing secrecy of records in civil cases that have been settled); Benjamin 
Weiser, Forging a 'Covenant of Silence'; Secret Settlement Shrouds Health Impact 
of Xerox Plant Leak, WASH. PosT, Mar. I3, I989, at AI {describing the secret 
settlement of a lawsuit which involved allegations that a Xerox facility leaked toxic 
chemicals into the groundwater, causing health problems for two families , and how 
that secrecy is hampering attempts by scientists and the public to learn about the 
effects of hazardous chemicals) . 
3 This argument is consistent with the autonomy model of litigation in which 
the litigants are the final arbiters of the progress of their litigation. See Federal 
Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., 8 1 9  F.2d 277 (Fed. Cir. I987) {defer­
ring to parties' interests in granting vacatur); Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt. ,  Inc. ,  
756 F.2d 280 {2d Cir.  1 985) (holding that district court abused its discretion in 
denying parties' joint motion to vacate). 
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that confidentiality serves a broader public policy, that of encourag­
ing settlement. 4 In this era of excessive litigation, settlement offers 
a prompter and less costly resolution of disputes, which is consis­
tent with the public interest. As courts held hostage to over­
crowded dockets search for ways to lighten their load, they are 
lil.cely to remain receptive to litigants' requests for secrecy. 
In the process of approving secrecy requests, however, courts 
can lose sight of the purpose behind their deference to the parties' 
wishes. This has led to a peculiar practice in which courts agree to 
destroy actual decisions in accordance with a settlement agreement 
by the parties. The settlement of a case after a decision has been 
rendered, whether as a result of a motion for summary judgment or 
a full trial, does not involve the same balance of interests as earlier 
requests for secrecy. Moreover, erasing a decision at the request of 
the parties threatens the integrity of the judicial process. It is this 
method of obtaining litigation secrecy, through the destruction of 
judicial decisions, that is the focus of this Article. 
I 
DESTRUCTION OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
The process of erasing a judicial decision varies somewhat de­
pending on the applicable jurisdiction, although the results are gen­
erally the same. In the federal courts and many state courts, 5 the 
parties may settle the litigation prior to or pending appeal. In ac­
cordance with their settlement, the parties then ask either the trial 
court or the appellate court to vacate the prior judgment, opinion, 
or both. 6 In some states, additional procedures for erasure are 
available. For example, the California Supreme Court will, under 
certain circumstances, order that an opinion by a lower appellate 
court be "depublished."7 Finally, courts have occasionally been 
4 See, e.g., Gina Kolata, Secrecy Orders in Lawsuits Prompt States' Efforts to 
Restrict Their Use, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1 8, 1 992, at DlO (quoting trial lawyers who 
defend the use of secrecy orders on the theory that they induce parties to settle and 
reduce litigation) . 
5 State courts often look to federal courts for guidance in this area. See, e.g., 
Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd. v. Fulenwider, 798 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1 990) (citing fed­
eral decisions on mootness and vacatur) .  
6 For a detailed description o f  this process, see Jill Fisch, Rewriting History: 
The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional Law through Settlement and Vacatur, 
76 CoRNELL L. REv. 589,  593-99 ( 1 99 1) .  
7 CAL . R .  CT . 976(c)(2) allows the California Supreme Court simply to order 
that the lower court opinion not be published .  The practice, which appears to be 
unique to California and is us ually executed in response to a letter or petition re-
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persuaded that their obligation to encourage settlement requires 
them to defer still further to the parties' request and actually rewrite 
a decision to conform to the litigants' wishes. Based on this reason­
ing, the California Supreme Court recently reversed a jury verdict 
based on the parties' stipulated request. 8 
The effect of these procedures is the same. The litig2.tion be­
tween the particular litigants is resolved in accordance with a settle­
ment agreement. Any finding of liability or wrongdoing is erased, 
and the parties are relieved of any accountability for it. The deci­
sion ceases to have preclusive effect against the parties and cannot 
be used in subsequent litigation by or against them.9 Additionally, 
the public value of the decision is diminished. The court's opinion 
may be physically removed from the record books or, if retained, 
may bear no explanation of the rationale behind the decision to va­
cate.10  Thus future litigants seeking to rely on the opinion's analy­
sis are left without an indication as to whether vacatur was the 
result of subsequent judicial doubts about the validity of that analy­
sis. Accordingly, few courts give respect even to the analysis of a 
quest from one of the parties, precludes the opinion from being published in  the 
official California Appellate Reports. See Stacy Gor don, Only Calzfornia Allows 
Justices to 'Depublish ', Bus. INs., June 15, 1992, at 14; Carrizosa, supra note 2. In  
addition, the Rules of  Court prohibit the depublished opinion from being cited as 
binding precedent for any other case . CAL R. CT . 977(a). As one commentator 
explains: "the opinion just disappears." Carrizosa, supra note 2, at 66. 
8 See Neary v. Regents of the Univ.  of Cal ., 834 P.2d 1 19, 128 (Cal. 1992). 
Documents submitted to the court in Neary i ndicated that California courts of 
appeal had reversed trial court decisions at the request of the litigants 12 times 
during a four year period. !d. at 129 (Kennard, J . ,  dissenting). The supreme court 
in Neary claimed its efforts did not constitute rewri ting or erasure. !d. at 124 
(claiming that "a stipulated reversal is not an attempt to erase or rewrite the record 
of trial . . "). Given the fact that the court affirmatively reversed the trial court 
decision, this disclaimer is not convincing. 
9 See generally William D. Zeller, Avoiding Issue Preclusion by Settlement 
Conditioned Upon the Vacatur of Entered Judgments, 96 YALE L.J. 860 ( 1987) . 
Cf Cal . R. Ct. 977 (a depublished decision, under the California rules, does retain 
preclusive, although not precedential effect). 
10 See Fisch, supra note 6, at 620 n.l63 ,  describing the process by which courts 
can destroy any indication that a vacated decision ever existed. The editor's note 
located at 724 F. Supp. 209 is illustrative: 
EDITOR'S NOTE: The opinion of the United States District Court, 
S.D.N.Y., Mason Tenders District Council Welfare Fund v. Akaty Construc­
tion Corp., published in the advance sheet at this ci tation, 724 F. Supp. 209-
224, was withdrawn from the bound volume because the opinion was vacated 
and withdrawn by order of the Court. 
If  a decision is vacated before the advance sheets are printed, the record books will 
lack even this minimal evidence of its existence. 
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decision that has been vacated. 1 1 
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Judicial decisions have particular value in environmental litiga­
tion, and secrecy in en·;ironmental cases is therefore a matter of 
public concern. In many environmental law suits, courts must in­
terpret complex statutes such as the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or 
Superfund).12 Courts must wrestle with complicated questions of 
insurance coverage and evaluate unfolding scientific evidence on the 
effects of chemicals and toxic substances. Expert testimony is often 
necessary and public expenditures in terms of judicial resources are 
considerable. 1 3  
When an environmental decision is  vacated, the public loses 
the resources that were expended not merely to resolve the dispute, 
but to develop the law. This is particularly true when the decision 
has addressed issues of first impression.1 4  Litigation in environmen­
tal insurance cases, for example, illustrates the success of insurers in 
retarding the development of the law, a process which is costly to 
the policyholder.1 5  Finally, to the extent that civil litigation oper­
ates to develop and enforce public values, the destruction of deci­
sions thwarts such efforts.16 
II See Fisch, supra note 6, at 6 15-24. But see Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan, 75 1 
F. Supp. 1454, 1 465 n .23  (D. Colo. 1 990), affd in part and rev'd in part, 937 F.2d 
498 ( lOth Cir. 1 99 1) (relying on the vacated district court opinion in Tosco Corp. 
v. Hodel, 6 1 1  F. Supp. 1 1 30 (D. Colo. 1 985), for its analysis). 
12 42 U .S.C. §§ 960 1-9675 ( 1 988 & Supp. I I I  1 99 1) .  CERCLA imposes retro­
active liability on companies for the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste. 
13 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Garcia, Big Rock Mesa Landslide Case a Mega-Trial, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1 988, §I ,  at 1 (describing time and expenses associated with 
preparing for and trying a large landslide case in California); J ack B. Weinstein, 
Factors in Determining the Degree of Public Availability of Judicial Opinions, 2 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.  244, 246- 49 ( 1 993) .  
14 Thus, for example, destruction of  the appellate court decision in  Montrose 
Chern. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 364 (Ct .  App.), review 
granted, 1 992 Cal. LEXIS 2554 ( 1 992), would require subsequent litigants to start 
from scratch on the issues addressed in the opinion, such as the interpretation of 
"trigger of coverage." See Letter from Kevin W:ilsh to California Supreme Court 
re Montrose Chern. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co. in Opposition to Request for Depub­
lication at 2 (Apr. 8, 1 992) (on file with author). See also infra Part IV.C.  
1 5 See infra Part IV.  C. 
16 See Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law 
Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 ( 1 982) (describing civil litiga­
tion as developing and enforcing public values and citing examples such as school 
desegregation, antitrust, and environmental law). 
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II  
THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF THE SETTLEMENT 
PROCESS 
1 95 
In an earlier piece, 1 7  I described the settlement of litigation in 
economic terms, under which a party will agree to settle if his or her 
expected gain from settlement exceeds the expected judgment less 
the costs of obtaining that judgment. A party's calculation of the 
expected judgment can be described as: 
n 




V = the expected value to be obtained at the conclusion of the 
litigation; 1 8 
J(n) = the range of possible judgments, with each J being one possi­
ble judgment; 19 
p(n) = the probability of obtaining a given judgment J (n); and 
c(t) = a negative number representing the cost of continuing to 
pursue the litigation to its conclusion at any given time t (rather 
than settling or voluntarily discontinuing the lawsuit). 
Thus, at any point in the litigation, a defendant should be able to 
persuade a plaintiff to settle by offering the plaintiff the ad damnum 
discounted both by the plaintiff's perceived risk that the lawsuit will 
be unsuccessful and by the costs of pursuing the litigation to final 
judgment. Prior to trial, settlement may not be possible, however, 
because the parties' perceptions of the likelihood of success may 
vary. 
The settlement process is greatly simplified after a trial court 
has reached a decision on liability. At this point, much of the po­
tential error associated with calculating the expected value of the 
judgment has been removed, subject only to the possibility the judg­
ment will be modified or reversed on appeal. 20 Post-decision then, 
17 Fisch,  supra note 6. 
18 This number represents, in quantified terms, the relief sought by the litigant. 
This rel ief may be legal, such as damages for pollution, or equitable, such as an 
injunction against further dumping. The expected value will be positive for a plain­
tiff who expects a net gain from the litigation, and negative for the defendant who 
views the expected judgment as a cost. 
19 The range of J (n) includes negative numbers for possible adverse judgements. 
See supra note 1 8 . 
20 This risk is relatively small. The vast majority of trial court decisions are 
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it is relatively easy for plaintiff and defendant to agree on the ex­
pected judgment. 
The foregoing calculation may be complicated, however, by 
several factors. First, an adverse judgment may result in collateral 
costs to a party. If a judgment of liability is associated with a loss of 
reputation, a finding of immoral or improper conduct, or dimin­
ished rights or benefits, the defendant may view the judgment as 
imposing greater costs than the amount of the verdict. In such a 
case, the defendant's calculation of the costs of the verdict might be 
adjusted to read:21 
n 
V = 2: p(n)[J(n) + K(n)) + c(t) 
1 
(equation 2) 
where K(n) is a negative number which represents the collateral 
costs to the defendant of a particular adverse judgment J(n). 
Second, the process is complicated if the litigation is not a one­
shot event. If an unfavorable verdict at trial will have adverse col­
lateral consequences, such as collateral estoppel effect in other re­
lated cases, or the resolution of a legal issue that will affect the 
litigant elsewhere, the litigant must take into account not merely 
the cost associated with the instant judgment, but the effect of that 
judgment on the related cases. This might cause the formula to 
read as: 
V =  
n 
2: p(n) [J(n) + 
1 
X 
2: V (x, J(n))) + c(t) 
1 
(equation 3) 
where V(x, J(n)) represents the expected verdict in each of the x 
other cases affected adversely by judgment J(n). In either situation, 
the circumstances impose asymmetrical costs upon the litigants, as 
the potential harm to the defendant from an adverse judgment is 
much greater than the potential gain to the plaintiff. 
III  
THE EFFECT OF ASYMMETRICAL COSTS ON 
SETTLEMENT 
The impact of asymmetrical costs imposed upon litigants by a 
affirmed on appeal. See Fisch, supra note 6, at 595  n.25 .  
2 1  The equation has been adjusted to reflect the fact that the total cost imposed 
on an unsuccessful defendant is the judgment, plus the litigation costs, plus the 
collateral costs. 
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judicial decision is considerable. Normally we trust the adversary 
process to produce settlements that are fair to both parties. 22 
Coase's theorem suggests that, if the liability rule is clear (which it 
is post-decision), and the transaction costs are minimal, the parties 
will bargain to reach an efficient resolution of the litigation. 23 But 
in the scenario in which the decision imposes large asymmetrical 
costs upon the defendant, the plaintiffs bargaining position is en­
hanced. Instead of being able to obtain a settlement amount up to 
the amount of the judgment, reduced by the costs and uncertainty 
associated with appellate review, the plaintiff can extort a larger 
payment if he or she can offer to have the adverse decision 
destroyed. 24 
The risk of this distortion to the settlement process is not hypo­
thetical. In Bankers Trust Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity 
Co., 25 the plaintiff sought insurance coverage for the cost of cor­
recting pollution damage to a river caused by a leaking fuel oil pipe. 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff and, pending a motion for rehearing, the case was settled 
conditioned on vacatur of the summary judgment decision. Seven 
years later, in an affidavit filed in another case, counsel for Bankers 
Trust revealed that the settlement agreement had resulted in Hart­
ford paying Bankers Trust approximately $200,000 more than the 
value of Bankers Trust's claim, with the understanding that the 
opinion finding Hartford liable would be withdrawn. 26 
This bargaining process presents a problem because the judicial 
decision is public propertyY By offering to have that decision de-
22 Naturally the imperfections of the judicial system frequently impose pres­
sures on litigants to accept settlements that may not be fair. The settlement pro­
cess has been criticized, for example, as favoring litigants who come to the process 
with a better bargai ning position, such as greater resources or no need for prompt 
resolution of the dispute. An analysis of the limitations of the settlement process is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
23 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. I, 4 
( 1960) .  
2 4  See, e.g., Vacatur is  "Bargaining Chip" in Post-Judgment Settlements, 7 Civ . 
Trial Man. (BNA) No. 14, at 300 (Aug.  7, 199 1 )  (describing increased popularity 
of post-judgment vacatur) .  
25 518  F. Supp. 37 1 ,  vacated, 62 1 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.  198 1). 
26 See Intel Corp. v .  Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1 17 1, 1 192  
n .32  (N.D. Cal. 1988) (describing contents of  affidavit by  counsel for Bankers 
Trust and terms of settlement agreement in Bankers Trust case). 
27 See Memorial Hosp. v. United States Dep't of Heal th & Human Servs., 862 
F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir . 1988) ("The precedent, a public act of a public official, is 
not the parties' property."). 
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strayed, the plaintiff obtains a windfall benefit, at the cost of others 
who would benefit from the decision, including other similarly situ­
ated litigants and the public at large. Cease's theorem fails because 
third party beneficiaries of the decision are not party to the agree­
ment to have it destroyed. 
Allowing destruction of judicial decisions also affects the initial 
settlement process. A defendant who faces a strong possibility of 
costly collateral consequences if she loses at trial is likely to settle 
early to avoid that risk. If the defendant can avoid the conse­
quences of an adverse judgment by buying his or her way out of it, 
there is less incentive to avoid trial altogether. This "free" roll of 
the dice increases the litigation expenses of both litigants at the 
costly pretrial and trial level and causes needless consumption of 
judicial resources.28 Additionally, where the parties are of unequal 
bargaining position, the defendant's ability to delay resolution by 
proceeding to a risk-free trial may enable the defendant to force the 
plaintiff to settle for even less. 
IV 
THE ROLE OF VACATUR IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LITIGATION 
The validity of the foregoing model is peculiarly evident in en­
vironmental litigation. Increasingly, parties to environmental litiga-
28 Court s  frequently defend their decisions to vacate on the ground that settle­
ment conditioned on vacatur conserves judicial resources. See Nestle Co. v. 
Chester's Mkt . ,  Inc., 756 F.2d 280 ,  284 (2d Cir. 1 985) (concluding that granting 
parties' request to vacate is justified by the importance of promoting settlement). 
Where parties have consumed the considerable judicial resources necessary to pro­
duce a trial court judgment, such arguments are less compelling. The parties in 
Neary v. Regents of the University of California, 834 P.2d 1 1 9 (Cal .  1 992), for 
example, spent more than 1 2  years in litigation. Prior to the jury trial ,  which 
lasted four months, the case reached the appellate division on appeal of a motion 
for summary judgment. Settlement of the case on appeal did not mitigate this 
substantial consumption of judicial resources. 
Moreover, the practice of permitting vacatur encourages parties to delay set­
tlement until after trial. See Fisch, supra note 6, at 635-38.  As Justice Kennard 
explained: 
If an adverse judgment can be deleted by a postjudgment settlement with 
stipulated reversal , parties concerned about the collateral consequences of an 
adverse judgment will have less incentive to settle their cases before trial and 
judgment. Cases that would have settled pretrial, with minimal judicial in­
volvement , will be tried before a court or jury, perhaps for days or even 
months, only to have the court or jury's considered decision erased by a stip­
ulated reversal .  
Neary, 834 P.2d at 1 29 (Kennard, J., dissent ing). 
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tion are using vacatur and related processes to destroy decisions 
they find unsatisfactory. The growing role of these practices in en­
vironmental litigation can be explained by several factors. 
A. Erasing the Finding of Wrongdoing 
One factor that explains the use of vacatur is the public appro­
bation given to those who pollute or cause other environmental 
harm. Public condemnation of defendants found liable for environ­
mental damage operates as a collateral cost, such as that addressed 
in equation 2 above. Even in situations where the plaintiff's sole 
motive is receipt of compensation, the defendant may seek to have 
the decision destroyed to preserve her good name. 
Defendants in Neary v. R egents of the University of Calzfornia29 
justified their request for stipulated reversal on these grounds. In 
Neary, plaintiff's herd of cattle had been treated with an insecticide 
to prevent a mite infestation. After the treatment, a large number 
of cattle died. Neary attributed the deaths to the treatment and, 
eventually, state agricultural officials agreed to have the matter in­
vestigated by veterinarians employed by the University of Califor­
nia.30 Three university veterinarians investigated the incident and 
subsequently wrote a report attributing the deaths to Neary's mis­
management rather than pesticide poisoning. 31 The report was 
published under the California Public Records Act. 32 
Neary sued both the University and the veterinarians for libel. 
After twelve years of litigation, including a four-month jury trial, he 
obtained a verdict against all defendants for $7 million.33 The de­
fendants appealed and, while the appeal was pending, offered to set­
tle the case for $3 million, conditioned on the court entering an 
order, based on the parties' stipulation, reversing the jury verdict 
and dismissing the case with prejudice. 34 Neary, who was reaching 
an advanced age and tiring of the protracted litigation, agreed. 35 
According to the California Appellate Division, the condition 
that the jury verdict be reversed was imposed by the individual de­
fendant veterinarians. Defendants' counsel explained the rationale 
29 278 Cal. Rptr. 773 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 834 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1992). 
30 Neary, 834 P.2d at 131 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
31 Jd. 
32 CAL. Gov'T CODE tit. 1, div. 7, §§ 6250-6254.2 (West 1993). 
33 278 Cal. Rptr. at 777. 
34 834 P.2d at 120. 
35 The defendants had already received permission to file over-length briefs on 
appeal. Jd . at 122. 
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for this request as follows: 
[R]eversal of the Superior Court's judgment is particularly im­
portant to the individual Appellants. Because they view the 
jury's verdict as a determination that they, along with a dozen 
other University scientists, knowingly and deliberately partici­
pated in writing a false scientific report, they believe the verdict 
has severely blemished their professional reputations and, as a 
result, significantly impaired their ability to function as produc­
tive members of the scientific community . . . . 36 
Unlike the Appellate Division, the California Supreme Court did 
not see a need to retain the jury verdict of liability. In spite of the 
fact that the veterinarians were public officials, whose professional 
reputations depend on their ability to evaluate accurately the envi­
ronmental impact of the state's pesticide program, the court did not 
see a need to preserve the jury's findings. Apparently the court at­
tached no value to the jury's determination that the veterinarians 
had deliberately falsified their scientific findings in attempting to 
blame the cattle deaths on mismanagement rather than the state 
agricultural department's use of a dangerous insecticide. 37 
A desire to avoid the public condemnation associated with en­
vironmental wrongdoing may also explain the activities of the Envi­
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) and ARCO in Kitlutsisti v. 
AR CO Alaska, Inc. 38 Plaintiffs sued ARCO and Exxon under the 
citizen suit provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act. 39 The EPA was joined as a party defendant based on its failure 
to process the defendants' applications for drilling permits under 
the statute.40 
After the district court found that ARCO and Exxon had ille­
gally discharged pollutants into Norton Sound and that the EPA 
had failed to perform its duties under the statute in processing per­
mit applications,41 the EPA promptly issued the defendants a drill-
36 278 Cal . Rptr. at 775. 
37 See 834 P.2d at 131 (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("Here, the majority has deter­
mined that the trial court's judgment has no value worth preserving."). 
38 592 F. Supp. 832, 835-37 (D. Alaska 1984), vacated, 782 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 
1986). 
39 33 U.S.  C. § 1365 (1982), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1365 ( 1988). 
40 592 F. Supp. at 836. 
41 Id. at 838- 44 (holding that the EPA violated its statutory duty  and finding 
that the EPA had repeatedly "been using 'creative' administ rative techniques of 
dubious legality to avoid [its) clear statutory mandate . . . of issuing NPDES 
permits."). 
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ing permit, mooting the controversy.42 The defendants43 then 
requested the court to vacate the district court decision, and the 
court agreed.44 One wonders whether the possibility of erasing the 
lower court finding of wrongdoing by the EPA influenced the 
EPA's decision to issue the drilling permit, which allowed the de­
fendants to "discharge a large amount of pollutants into the 
water."45 
The consequence of the disappearing decisions in both Neary 
and Kitlutsisti is that public officials found liable for wrongdoing 
were aliowed to preserve clean reputations. The public cost of this 
practice is the loss of their accountability. 
B. A voiding the Consequences of Collateral Estoppel 
Parties to environmental litigation may also seek to have deci­
sions destroyed because of their collateral estoppel effect on subse­
quent litigation. Like products liability and other mass torts, 
environmental cases frequently involve a single incident or transac­
tion that has allegedly caused harm to a large group of plaintiffs. 
Thus a readily-identifiable group of plaintiffs will benefit from the 
collateral estoppel effect of a finding of liability.46 This places the 
defendant in the equation 3 scenario where failure to destroy the 
adverse decision will result in virtually certain liability in the many 
subsequent cases.47 
Vacatur can also operate in the reverse direction, destroying a 
decision that has freed the defendant from liability. While preclu-
42 782 F.2d at 80 1 .  
43 Plaintiffs objected t o  vacatur o f  the district court decision. Id. 
44 782 F.2d at 802.  
4 5  592 F. Supp. at 835 .  
46 See , e.g., Zeller, supra note 9, at 878 (illustrating this with a mass asbestos 
tort hypothetical ). 
47 See generally Fisch, supra note 6 (discussing the offensive collateral estoppel 
doctrine and the implications of vacatur on preclusion); Zeller, supra note 9 
(same). Some schol ars have crit icized application of offensive collateral estoppel in 
mass tort and environmental claims on the grounds that a single unfavorable result 
has disastrous implications for the defendant. See , e .g., Brainerd Currie, Mutuality 
of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of t he Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 2 8 1  
( 1 957) (describing potential unfairness i n  litigating liability for railroad accident 
sequentially against 50 plaintiffs). But see Fisch, supra note 6, at 622-23 (describ­
ing fairness analysis which balances the interests of the public in the finality of 
judgments against the interests of private litigants in ending the litigation through 
settl ement). See also id. at 623 n. 1 75 (describing support for the offensive collat­
eral estoppel doctrine as eliminating the costly need to relitigate endlessly issues of 
liability). 
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sion doctrines do not bar subsequent plaintiffs from re1itigating is­
sues decided in a prior suit to which they were not a party, litigation 
in mass tort and other multiparty environmental cases has increas­
ingly involved the use of test cases to resolve common questions of 
liability. Under this approach, a single plaintiffs lawsuit may be 
litigated with the expectation that the result of that lawsuit will be 
authoritative, if not technically binding, in resolving or settling the 
remaining cases. 48 
Under this scenario, vacatur is damaging because it can leave 
the remaining litigants without the precedent they sought. A decer­
tification order by the California Supreme Court nearly forced a 
massive relitigation in connection with the 1983 Big Rock Mesa 
landslide in Malibu, California, which destroyed thirty homes and 
damaged two hundred more in the Los Angeles area. A test case 
promised to resolve issues important in all 230 lawsuits. 49 .Plaintiff 
homeowners in Hansch v. County of Los A ngeles50 sued the County 
of Los Angeles alleging that government officials had approved de­
velopment of the mesa with seepage pits and horizontal drains 
rather than sewers, which contributed to a rise in ground water trig­
gering the landslide. The parties spent massive sums litigating the 
case,51 and the trial resulted in a $2.74 million verdict in favor of 
the homeowners, a verdict that exposed county taxpayers to poten­
tial liability of $500 million. 52 
48 Such test litigation reduces the costs of relitigating a complicated issue. 
49 See Hansch v. County of L.A. ,  247 Cal. Rptr. 809, 811-12 (Ct. App. 1988) 
("Hundreds of plaintiffs filed scores of actions for damages. These actions were 
consolidated. The present action was severed from the others 'for the purpose of 
trying it first as a test case.' ") ; Koch-Ash v. Superior Court ,  225 Cal . Rptr. 657, 
658 (Ct. App. 1986) ("the 'Hansch' action was severed from the 4 7 'Ibarra' actions 
for the purpose of trying it first as a test case that might resolve various issues of 
liability pertaining to the 'Ibarra' actions"). Cf. Garcia, supra note 13 (stating 
David Casselman, one of the County's attorneys, claimed that the homeowners' 
lawyers had said Hansch would be considered a test case for the other lawsuits and 
that the other homeowners would be bound by the verdict; homeowners' lawyer 
Kenneth Chiate allegedly denied the statement). The trial judge refused to dismiss 
the remaining cases holding that there was insufficient evidence that the parties 
agreed to be bound by the Hansch outcome, in light of the Supreme Court's order 
vacating Hansch. Kenneth J. Garcia, Ruling on Big Rock Mesa Case Sets the 
Stage for Huge Trial, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1988, § 2, at 10. 
50 247 Cal. Rptr. 809 (Ct. App.), review denied and depublication o rdered, 1988 
Cal. LEXIS 193 (Sept. 15, 1988), and cert. dismissed, 489 U.S .  1074 (1989). 
51 Kenneth Chiate, the homeowners' lawyer, stated that the county spent $5 
million defending itself in the Hansch case. Garcia, supra note 13. See also Car­
rizosa, supra note 2, at 66 (quoting Los Angeles lawyer, Gideon Kanner, "A king's 
ransom was spent preparing and trying that case on the merits.").  
52 Myrna Oliver, Justices Overturn Award for Damage from Afalibu Slide, L.A. 
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The trial court decision in Hansch was overturned by the ap­
pellate division,53 however, which found that the government's ap­
proval of the development plans did not make it liable for the 
landslide and which condemned the trial court decision for its 
broad imposition upon the public of liability for this type of disas­
ter. Rather than reviewing the case, the California Supreme Court 
decertified the appellate division opinion, 54 leaving both sides with­
out a precedent after expending millions of dollars. 55 The entire 
litigation was nearly repeated in a mass triaJ56 when the case was 
settled for $97 million. 57 
C. Retarding the Development of Case Law 
Vacatur also destroys a valuable resource: the prior judicial de­
cision. Decisions in environmental cases are particularly valuable 
because they frequently involve difficult questions of law and fact. 
Environmental cases cause courts to grapple with such issues as the 
interpretation and validity of statutes, the interpretation of contract 
clauses regarding insurance coverage of pollution clean-up costs,58 
and the effects of hazardous substances upon individuals and the 
environment. Vacatur has destroyed, for example, the effect of a 
comprehensive fifty-six page opinion interpreting and evaluating the 
validity of two statutes preventing the operation of the Shoreham 
Nuclear Power Plant.59 
A sequence of cases involving litigation over rights to oil shale 
mining patents under federal mining law illustrates the costs created 
TIMES, June 8, 1 988, § 2, at I. 
53 247 Cal. Rptr. 809 (Ct. App. 1 988) .  
5 4  Hansch v. County of L .A. ,  1 988  Cal. LEXIS 1 93 (Sept.  1 5 , 1 988) (denying 
review and ordering appellate division opinion depublished). 
55 Carrizosa, supra note 2, at 66. 
56 Garcia, supra note 1 3  (describing preparation for the "mega-trial" which was 
expected to last two to five years and cost more than $ 1 00 mill ion in attorneys' fees 
alone). 
57 Kenneth J. Garcia, The Case that Won't Go Away, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 
1 989, § 9, at I (describing settlement terms). I nterestingly, the Hansches, who had 
lost in the appellate division, shared in the settlement. Carrizosa, supra note 2, at 
66. 
58 On the difficulty of interpreting pollution exclusion clauses to determine in­
surance coverage for clean-up costs, see Jonathan C. Averback, Comparing the Old 
and the New Pollution Exclusion Clauses in General Liability Insurance Policies: 
New Language-Same Results?, 14  B .C. ENYTL. AFF. L. REV. 60 1 ( 1 987). 
59 Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370 (N.D.N.Y. 1 9 87), 
vacated in part and remanded with instructions to dismiss, 888 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 
1 989). 
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by vacatur. The litigation of these rights has been extremely com­
plex, spanning sixty years and involving numerous cases at the trial 
and appellate level. 60 The lengthy district court opinion in Tosco 
Corp. v. Hodel addressed many difficult issues, yet the Tenth Circuit 
vacated the district court opinion when the litigants settled their 
dispute pending appeal.61 As a result of the vacatur, many of the 
issues resolved in the Tosco opinion subsequently had to be 
relitigated. 62 
The time and effort invested in resolving these issues is a public 
resource, which benefits future actors as well as subsequent liti­
gants. The Hansch litigation is a prime example of the importance 
of this resource. The value of the decision is only partially captured 
in its role as precedent. By clarifying the law, judicial decisions in­
form parties as to their rights and responsibilities with regard to the 
environment and cause reform of procedures for handling environ­
mental problems. Litigation may also advance the state of scientific 
knowledge by examining the handling procedures and health effects 
of hazardous substances. These benefits are lost and the time and 
money expended on environmental lawsuits are squandered when 
judicial resolutions of these issues are destroyed. 
The ability of litigants to retard the development of the law by 
vacating judicial decisions offers a particular opportunity for manip­
ulation in environmental litigation. Unlike many areas of the law in 
which litigation is a one shot, isolated event in the life of the parties, 
litigants in environmental litigation are frequently involved in re­
peated similar cases. Such "repeat players" include manufacturers 
of hazardous substances, such as toxic chemicals, and insurance 
companies who are drawn into litigation when their policies cover 
instances of pollution or clean-up costs. For these litigants, envi­
ronmental litigation involves more than a resolution of specific 
transactions; it involves the development of legal doctrine which 
will continue to govern their rights and responsibilities. 
Under these circumstances, the repeat players have strong fi-
60 See, e.g. , Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan, 75 1 F. Supp. 1454, 1456  (D. Colo. 
1 990), a .ffd in part a nd rev'd in part, 937 F.2d 498 ( lOth Cir. 1991) .  
616 1 1 F. Supp. 1 1 30 (D. Colo. 1985), va ca ted by,  826 F.2d 948 ( lOth Cir. 
1 9 87). 
62 See Maratho n  Oil, 75 1 F. Supp. at 1 465 n .23 (addressing relitigation of Tosco 
issues); Russell v. Turnbaugh, 774 F. Supp. 597, 599 n.2 (D. Colo. 1 99 1 )  (vacatur 
of Tosco required relitigation of many issues in Marathon Oil). The court in Mara­
thon Oil explained that "[ i]t is the objective of this opinion to resolve issues inher­
ent in this litigation and also to add clarity and practical application of legal 
principles that impact mining law. " 75 1 F. Supp. at 1456 n. l. 
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nancia1 incentives to monitor the development of the law and to pay 
to have unfavorable decisions removed from the books, so that they 
can convincingly relitigate the issue and argue that the weight of 
authority is on their side. 63 Few judges appear troubled by these 
transparent efforts to manipulate the weight of authority.64 
The litigation of insurance coverage for damages and clean-up 
costs resulting from oil spills, chemical leaks, and other pollution­
related events provides an example of this manipulation. As pollu­
tion-related liability becomes increasingly common, particularly in 
connection with environmental legislation such as CERCLA, which 
imposes clean-up costs on those responsible for pollution-related 
damage, questions of policy coverage have become increasingly im­
portant in determining whether insurers are responsible for paying 
these costs under general liability policies. 65 These coverage ques-
63 Repeat pl ayers have a similar incentive to insure that favorable decisions are 
not overturned. See ,  e.g. , Roger Parloff , Rigging The Common Law, AM. LAw. ,  
Mar. 1992, at 74  ("a thriving black market has developed in  opinions, w ith top 
dollar paid to keep them on- or off- the books. "). Some commentators suggest that 
this motivation explains settlements in cases such as Travelers Insurance Co. v. 
Ross Elect ric of Washington, Inc . ,  685 F. Supp. 742 (W.O. Wash. 1988), in which, 
on a part ial motion for summary judgment, the district court issued a pro-insur­
ance company decision holding that the standard form liability insurance policies 
did not cover response costs under CERCLA. Following the decision, the insur­
ance company settled. Lawyers for Ross Electric described the settlement by stat­
ing that Travelers agreed to pay "ultimately what we were asking for, even though 
they won the summary judgment . . . .  We got more money than we would have, 
because they wished to have that decision on the record. That was clear in  the 
negot iat ions. " Parloff, supra, at 77  (quoting John McKerricher, counsel for Ross 
Electric). 
64 An exception is Judge Earl J.  Johnson of the California Appellate Division. 
In a recent dissenting opinion in Slater v. Lawyers' Mutual Insurance Co., 278 Cal .  
Rptr. 4 79  (Ct . App. 1 99 1 ), Judge Johnson criticized the majority opinion for giving 
the impression that the "weight of authority " supported the defendant insurance 
company's position. 
[T]he "weight of authority " . . .  is inconclusive on this issue. It is also de­
ceiving, because it has been shaped in part by the well conceived l itigation 
strategy of at least one of the insurance companies involved in  these appeals.  
One important appellate decision . . .  has been purged from the law books as 
a result of a settlement agreement between that insurance company and the 
successful appellant. A determined attempt was made to do the same in 
another case. 
!d. at 486 (footnotes omitted). 
65 An example is the legal doctrine interpret ing the scope of pollut ion exclusion 
clauses in general l iability insurance policies. Insurance policies typically use a 
number of standard contract terms. Many such standardized policies excluded 
coverage for pollution-related injuries, under so-called "pollution exclusion 
clauses." Pollution exclusion clauses denied coverage for pollution-related injuri es 
unless the injuries arose from pollution that was "sudden and accidental . " For a 
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tions are generally unimportant to policyholders except as they af­
fect a particular case in which the policyholder seeks coverage for a 
pollution-related injury. 
The development of legal doctrine in this area is of far more 
consequence for insurance companies, however. Cases upholding 
coverage for pollution-related damages threaten insurers with enor­
mous liability for coverage. One commentator has described the 
resolution of insurance coverage for clean-up costs under CERCLA 
as "a trillion-dollar question."66 
Accordingly, vacatur and similar procedures have been used 
frequently to erase decisions that broadly interpret pollution-related 
insurance coverage.67 Thus the Bankers Trust decision described 
above, which constituted a strong pro-policyholder precedent that 
general liability policies cover pollution cleanup costs, was erased at 
a cost of more than the ad damnum, the insurance community pre­
sumably viewing the ruling as far too damaging to remain on the 
books. As one commentator observed, the ruling "should have es­
tablished an important precedent that other policyholders seeking 
coverage for environmental cleanup costs could cite. "68 
In another example, the Eleventh Circuit in Reliance Insurance 
Co. v. Kent Corp. , 69 reversed the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Reliance Insurance. The case addressed the 
question of whether Reliance was responsible under a comprehen­
sive policy for damages caused by an emission of hazardous gases 
from Kent property during a fire. The district court had concluded 
that the emissions constituted a polluting event which was excluded 
under the pollution exclusion clause. 70 
Although the circuit court did not reverse this aspect of the 
district court finding, it held that summary judgment was prema­
ture because questions of material fact remained as to the cause of 
the damages. 71 It consequently found that the question of coverage 
comprehensive description of the development of pollution exclusion clauses and 
judicial interpretations of those clauses, see Averback, supra note 58 .  
6 6  Parloff, supra note 63 ,  a t  76. 
67 One commentator has stated that a random search of California decisions 
showed that pro-policyholder decisions had been vacated more frequently than 
those favoring insurers. Stacy Gordon, Vanishing Precedents, Bus. INs. ,  June 1 5 , 
1 992, at 1 ,  1 4. 
68 !d. at 1 .  
69 896 F.2d 501 ( l i th Cir.), vacated, 909 F.2d 424 ( l i th Cir. 1 990). 
70 896 F.2d at 502-03 . 
7 !  In particular, the court took a narrow view of "polluting event ," focusing on 
the question of whether a can of Toluol exploded or was burned in the fire and 
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could not be resolved and that Reliance continued to have a duty to 
defend. 72 Shortly after the opinion was issued, the parties settled 
the litigation, and the circuit court's decision, which could be 
viewed as broadening the obligations of an insurance company to 
defend even under a broad interpretation of the pollution exclusion 
clause, was vacated. 73 
Similarly, an unpublished opinion by Judge Brucia on a motion 
for summary judgment in State of New York v. Inwood Petroleum 
Corp. , 74 interpreted National Union's coverage obligations broadly 
in connection with an oil spill and upheld National Union's duty to 
defend the insured against claims under New York state law for 
clean-up costs. The case was promptly settled. The settlement 
agreement provided that the settlement was contingent upon Judge 
Brucia's vacating his decision. 75 
Most recently, the California Appellate Division issued a pro­
policyholder opinion in Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insur­
ance Co. 76 dealing with Montrose's insurance coverage for the dis­
charge of hazardous waste. The opinion addressed, in particular, 
the question of when hazardous waste contamination is said to "oc­
cur" so as to trigger insurance coverage. Following issuance of the 
decision, the Association of Defense Counsel of Northern California 
requested the California Supreme Court to depublish the Montrose 
decision, claiming that its holding was aberrational. 77 The Califor­
nia Supreme Court has granted review of the Montrose decision, 
and the case is pending, yet already the defense insurance bar has 
advised the court in another pending case that the continued vitality 
of the Montrose decision is questionable.78 
caused emission of hazardous gases. !d. at 503. 
72 !d. at 504. 
73 Reliance Ins. Co. v. Kent Corp. ,  909 F.2d 424 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 990) (vacating 
panel opinion in light of settlement). 
74 State of N.Y.  v. Inwood Petroleum Corp., No. 2 1 799-89 (Sup. Ct. Nass. Co. 
Mar. 8,  1 9 9 1 )  (on file with author). 
75 State of N.Y.  v. Inwood Petroleum Corp. ,  No. 2 1 799-89, at 3,  � 4 (Sup. Ct. 
Nass. Co. Nov. 1 8, 1 9 9 1 )  (Stipulation of Settlement) (on file with author). 
76 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct. App. 1 992), review gran ted, 1 992 Cal. LEXIS 2554 
( 1 992). 
77 See Letter from Kevin Walsh to California Supreme Court re Montrose 
Chern. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co. in Opposition to Request for Depublication (Apr. 
8,  1 992) (on file with author). 
78 See Letter from Elizabeth G. Leavy to the Honorable Ina L. Gyemant re 
Flintkote v. American Mut. (Mar. ! I, 1 992) (on file with author) (stating that 
there is "good reason to believe" that the Supreme Court will either review or 
depublish the Montrose decision, in which case "the decision can have no bearing 
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It is hard to know how commonly insurance companies em­
ploy these procedures. The very fact of vacatur, particularly at the 
trial level, erases the evidence of the decision that the defendant 
seeks to destroy. Accordingly, it is not possible to determine, 
through LEXIS searches or case reporters, how many decisions 
have been destroyed. Nor is it possible to draw conclusions about 
the extent to which these decisions, if preserved, might have been 
useful in future litigation. Much of the information on disappearing 
decisions takes the form of anecdotal evidence. This evidence sug­
gests that the extent to which the insurance companies' efforts have 
been successful is considerable. One insurance company lawyer has 
been quoted as claiming close to a fifty percent success rate in get­
ting adverse appellate court decisions wiped out.79 
CONCLUSION 
The effect of court-sanctioned vacatur, depublication, and simi­
lar doctrines is particularly problematic in environmental litigation. 
In addition to distorting the settlement process, vacatur may de­
stroy the ability of third parties to use a decision for purposes of 
collateral estoppel. It also frustrates the development of a complex 
area of the law, causing parties to spend money to relitigate the 
same issues and preventing future environmental actors from learn­
ing their legal rights. Finally, destruction of decisions destroys ac­
countability. Civil litigation in the environmental area, like much 
civil litigation, supplements government oversight over private con­
duct. Private causes of action operate not merely to compensate but 
to uncover and deter conduct deemed detrimental to societal values. 
Thus environmental litigants are properly viewed as acting, in part, 
as private attorneys general through their use of the litigation 
process.80 
These attributes of litigation are most thoroughly eviscerated 
by the destruction of decisions imposing liability. Erasing the find­
ing of liability erases the statement to other potential actors that the 
conduct was wrongful, that this defendant was responsible, and that 
society requires payment for the consequences. Private civil litiga-
on the result in the present case"). 
7 9 Carrizosa, supra note 2, at 65-66 (quoting Ellis J. Horvitz of Horvitz & 
Levy). 
so Cf Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt . ,  756  F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1 985) (refusing 
to force l itigants to continue as "private attorneys general" when they wished to 
settle conditioned on vacatur). 
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tion supplements government action through criminal, administra­
tive, and civil enforcement proceedings,  in  imposing this 
accountability. Here then lies the answer to those who would de­
fend secrecy by deferring to the right of litigants to control the 
course of their lawsuit .  When the government has provided private 
litigation as an adj unct to government action, such litigation serves 
a public purpose, and the disposition of that litigation should not be 
left solely in the hands of the parties. 
